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Abstract. In this paper we apply decomposition methods to analyze some of the
factors accounting for the decrease in household expenditures inequality in Spain
during the 1980s. We adopt a simple one-parameter model in which equivalence
scales depend only on household size. Then we propose an inequality decom-
position method which minimizes equivalence scales’ potential contamination
problems. We find that most of the change in overall inequality is due to a re-
duction in the within-group term in the partition by household size. The bulk
of this reduction is accounted for by changes at the lower tail of the distribu-
tion in the partitions by the socioeconomic category and educational level of the
household head. These two findings are independent of the equivalence scales
parameter.
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1 Introduction
The increasing availability of microeconomic data on the income distribution in
countries all over the world, has made possible the appearance of a vast litera-
ture on intertemporal comparisons of income inequality within specific countries
during the last 25 years. There are several reasons why the Spanish case is an
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interesting one. At the political level, Spain became a democracy during the mid-
1970s and a full member of the European Union in 1986, while at the economic
level it became involved in a complex process of economic modernization and
liberalization resulting in a more open and market oriented economy. At the same
time, Spain took important steps towards a fairly comprehensive safety net in an
attempt to catch up in the construction of a Welfare State comparable to those
existing in other Western societies. In so doing, both the direct and the indirect
tax systems were profoundly modified. Thus, a modern and rather progressive
income tax system was put in place in 1978, while the EU membership led to
the introduction of a value added tax system together with the suppression of a
number of ad valorem indirect taxes.
In the midst of these transformations, how did income inequality evolve in
Spain during this period? As in Portugal, which has gone through similar political
and economic reforms in essentially the same time frame, Spain saw a decrease
in both household income and expenditures inequality, a different trend from
many OECD countries1. From this perspective, the Iberian peninsula’s experi-
ence could be of interest to other economies in transition, in Latin America as
well as in Eastern Europe. However, in order to draw relevant lessons we need a
full understanding of the mechanisms which have made possible the compatibil-
ity between such a significant process of political and economic reform and the
reduction in household income and expenditures inequality. This paper makes a
contribution in this direction, applying decomposable methods to analyze some of
the factors accounting for the decline in Spanish household expenditures inequal-
ity during the 1980s. The data used are the 1980–1981 and 1990–1991 Encuestas
de Presupuestos Familiares (EPF for short), the budget surveys collected by the
INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadı´stica) with the main purpose of estimating the
weights of the official consumer price index.
For every population partition, decomposable measures of inequality allow us
to express overall inequality in a crosssection as the sum of two terms: a weighted
sum of within-group inequalities, plus a between-group inequality component. In
this paper, the between-group component is calculated as if each person within a
given group received the group’s mean income2. On the other hand, in a heteroge-
neous world where households with different characteristics have different needs,
the first order of business is to decide “who are the equals”. This leads to what
we call the basic partition formed by ethically homogeneous subgroups within
which income is directly comparable. Then comes a rule to perform interpersonal
welfare comparisons across heterogeneous subgroups. To simplify the analysis,
researchers usually engage in decomposability exercises for the distribution of
1 For the 1980s and Portugal, see Gouveia and Tavares (1995) and Rodrigues (1993); for Spain,
see Del Rı´o and Ruiz-Castillo (1996, 2001), Alvarez et al. (1996) and Pena (1996); and for the
international experience, see, for instance, Atkinson et al. (1995) and Gottschalk and Smeeding
(1997). As a matter of fact, the inequality reduction in Spain has been taking place since 1973–1974
– see Ruiz-Castillo (1995b, 1998), and INE (1996).
2 The seminal papers on inequality decomposition are Bourguignon (1979) and Shorrocks (1980,
1984). For recent discussions of the issues involved in decomposition analysis, see Cowell and
Jenkins (1995) and Ruiz-Castillo (1995a).
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equivalised income according to a single equivalence scale3 However, as Coulter
et al. (1992a) conclude, there is no single ’correct’ equivalence scale for adjust-
ing incomes. Thus, a range of scale relativities is both justifiable and inevitable.
This, of course, might affect the results and will complicate the decomposition
analysis.
In this paper, we propose an inequality decomposition method in three steps
which minimizes the complications induced by the use of a wide range of equiv-
alence scales. In the first place, to make the analysis tractable we adopt the sim-
plest admissible equivalence scale model, first used by Buhmann et al. (1988)
and Coulter et al. (1992a, b). In this model, the only household characteristic
which gives rise to differences in needs is household size, and different assump-
tions about the importance of economies of scale in consumption are represented
through a single parameter. In the second place, we select the mean logarithmic
deviation as our decomposable index. In this way, when we restrict ourselves to
the basic partition by household size, we can express overall inequality as the
sum of a within-group term, independent of the equivalence scale parameter (the
uncontaminated term), and a between-group term which captures all the conse-
quences of making interpersonal welfare comparisons according to a range of
equivalence scale parameter values (the contaminated term). In the third place,
we study non-basic partitions in a novel way by applying the decomposability of
our inequality index to the uncontaminated term. As a result, this term is seen to
be equal to a within-group and a between-group term for each non-basic variable
which captures solely the orthogonal effects with respect to household size.
As far as the analysis of the inequality trend, the procedure presents the fol-
lowing two advantages. (i) For any non-basic partition we can decompose the
inequality trend into four terms. The first three terms are independent of the
equivalence scale parameter: a) the change in within-group inequality (due to
changes in subgroup inequality values), b) the change in between-group inequal-
ity (due to the relative variations in subgroup means), and c) the demographic
change across partition subgroups (due to shifts in subgroup population shares).
The fourth term, capturing the changes in the contaminated term (due to the rela-
tive variations in household size subgroup means), is the only one dependent on
the assumptions we make about the importance of economies of scale. (ii) The
results for the total population can be easily related to the ones at the specific
subgroup level for both the basic and the non-basic partitions. In a context where
a considerable part of the trend in overall inequality is accounted for by changes
in within-group inequality, it is important to know which specific subgroups are
contributing positively and negatively to a given change in this term.
3 See, for example, Jenkins (1995) and Borooah and Collins (1995) for the UK, Gouveia and
Tavares (1995) and Rodrigues (1993) for Portugal, Tsakloglou (1993) for Greece, and Ja¨ntti (1997)
for international comparisons using the LIS data base. In the seminal contribution to decomposition
analysis, Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1982) study the evolution of unadjusted household income by
age of household using published UK group data from the Family Expenditure System; therefore, no
equivalence scale is considered at all.
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The main findings are as follows. According to the mean logarithmic de-
viation, household expenditures inequality in Spain decreases during the 1980s
by 8 to 10% depending on the value of the equivalence scale parameter. Most
of this variation is due to a reduction of 10.3% in the uncontaminated term. In
turn, the bulk of this change can be accounted for by the changes occurring in
the partitions by the socioeconomic category and the educational level of the
household head. This is especially the case at the lower tail of the distribution,
occupied by households headed by a retired person or someone belonging to the
agricultural categories, in the first partition, or by an illiterate or a person without
formal studies in the second one.
The paper is organized in five sections. In Sect. 2, we present the decom-
position method, emphasizing both its strengths and its limitations in empirical
applications. In Sect. 3 we describe the data. In Sect. 4 we present a brief de-
scription of the macroeconomic evolution of Spain during the 1980s and report
our results accounting for the trend in expenditure inequality in terms of the
partition by household size and five other household characteristics. Section 5
summarizes the paper and discusses the main results.
2 The decomposition method
2.1 Interpersonal comparisons of welfare
Assume we have a population of h = 1,...,H households whose living standards
can be adequately represented by a one-dimensional variable we call income, x h .
Households can differ in income and/or a vector of household characteristics. As
indicated in the Introduction, we assume that equivalence scales depend only on
the number of persons in the household. Households of the same size are assumed
to have the same needs and, therefore, their incomes are directly comparable.
Larger households have greater needs, but also greater opportunities to achieve
economies of scale in consumption. Assume that there are m = 1,...,M household
sizes in what we call the basic partition. Following Buhmann et al. (1988) and
Coulter et al. (1992a, b), for each household h of size m we define equivalised
income by
z h (Θ) = x h/mΘ, Θ ∈ [0, 1].
When Θ = 0, equivalised income coincides with original household income,
while if Θ = 1, it becomes per capita household income. Taking a single adult
as the reference type, the expression mΘ can be interpreted as the number of
equivalent adults in a household of size m. Thus, the greater the equivalence
elasticity Θ, the smaller the economies of scale in consumption or, in other
words, the larger the number of equivalent adults4.
4 As pointed out in Buhmann et al. (1988), one of the advantages of this approach is that many other
models can be characterized by a certain value of Θ. In particular, Jenkins and Cowell (1994) report
that the McClements scale, used by Jenkins (1995) and many other authors in the UK, represents
an equivalence elasticity of 0.67. On the other hand, according to Ruiz-Castillo (1998), due to the
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Let xm and zm (Θ) be, respectively, the vector of original and equivalised
incomes for households of size m. Notice that, if I is any index of relative
inequality, then for each m
I (zm (Θ)) = I (xm/mΘ) = I (xm ).
Thus, within each subgroup with the same needs, we assume that the inequality
of equivalised income is equal to the inequality of original income, independent
of individual income and prices.
This is possibly the simplest and more convenient of all interesting equiva-
lence scale models5. Household size is undeniably a crucial characteristic under-
lying all models; the scheme we adopt is widely used, and it allows for a wide
range of assumptions about the importance of economies of scale. Moreover, this
model combines very well with the decomposition procedure we present in the
next subsection in which the effects of changing the value of Θ are conveniently
isolated in a single term.
2.2 The decomposition of overall inequality for the basic partition
We say that an inequality index is decomposable by population subgroup, if the
decomposition procedure of overall inequality into a within-group and a between-
group term is valid for any arbitrary population partition. It is well known that
the GE (Generalized Entropy) family of inequality indices are the only measures
of relative inequality that satisfy the usual normative properties required from
any inequality index and, in addition, are decomposable by population subgroup
(see the references in Footnote 2). The family can be described by means of the
following convenient cardinalization:
Ic(z(Θ)) = (1/H )(1/c2 − c)Σh{(z h (Θ)/µ(zh (Θ))c − 1}, c /= 0, 1;
I0(z(Θ)) = (1/H )Σh log{µ(zh (Θ))/z h (Θ)};
I1(z(Θ)) = (1/H )Σh{(z h (Θ)/µ(zh (Θ))}log{z h (Θ)/µ(zh (Θ))},
where µ(.) is the mean of the distribution. The parameter c summarizes the
sensitivity of Ic in different parts of the income distribution: the more positive
(negative) c is, the more sensitive Ic is to differences at the top (bottom) of the
distribution (Cowell and Kuga 1981). I1 is the original Theil index, while I0 is
the mean logarithmic deviation.
Coulter et al. (1992a, b) have shown how the inequality estimates provided
by the GE family vary systematically with the parameter Θ which captures the
non-linearity of the relationship between income inequality and the equivalence scale parameter Θ
in Spain, the so-called OECD scale, widely used internationally, represents an equivalence elasticity
of 0.4 or 0.7, approximately. Jenkins and Cowell (1994) report that the OECD scale in the UK
corresponds to a value of Θ = 0.75.
5 For two parameter empirical models which take into account household composition, see Cutler
and Katz (1992) and Jenkins and Cowell (1994). For a critical survey of econometric and other
methods, see Coulter et al. (1992a).
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generosity of the scale. They illustrate their analysis with UK data6. However,
they suggest that using the GE family in its decomposable form restricts the
‘contamination’ of the inequality orderings that will arise if there is incomplete
or incorrect information about the equivalence scale. In this way, some robust
conclusions, independent of the equivalence scale, can be obtained.
To see this, consider the formula for the GE index when written in decom-
posable form for the partition by household size:
Ic(z(Θ)) = Σm [(vm (Θ))c(pm )1−c]Ic(zm (Θ)) + Ic(µ1(Θ), ...,µM (Θ)),
where vm (Θ) is the share of total equivalised income held by households of size
m for each Θ; pm is group m’s population share, and Ic(µ1(Θ), ...,µM (Θ)) is
the between-group inequality calculated as if each household of a given size
m received that group’s mean equivalised income µm (Θ)7. Taking into account
that, for each m, Ic(zm (Θ)) = Ic(xm ), Coulter et al. (1992a) indicate that when
c = 0, using the ‘wrong’ equivalence scale only contaminates the between group
component. In this case, denoting by U and C(Θ) the uncontaminated and the
contaminated terms, respectively, we have:
I0(z(Θ)) = U + C (Θ), (1)
where
U = ΣmpmI0(xm ). (2)
Equation (2) is the weighted average of the inequality within each household
size with weights equal to population shares, and C (Θ) = I0(µ1(Θ), ...,µM (Θ))
is the between-group inequality which depends on Θ8. In order to simplify the
notation, in the rest of the paper we will denote the mean logarithmic deviation,
not by I0, but simply by I .
2.3 The decomposition of overall inequality for non-basic partitions
For any non-basic partition of the population into k = 1, ...,K subgroups, the
direct decomposition of overall inequality, which is the one usually applied in
the literature (see Footnote 3), is:
I (z(Θ)) = W k (Θ) + Bk (Θ) (3)
where
6 This has been confirmed in other countries. For Portugal, see Rodrigues (1993). For Spain, see
Ruiz-Castillo (1995b) for the period 1973–1974 to 1980–1981, and Del Rı´o and Ruiz-Castillo (1997a)
for the period 1980–1881 to 1990–1991.
7 For the connection between the inequality index cardinalization choice and the definition of
between-group inequality, see Cowell and Jenkins (1995).
8 The only other member of the GE family for which the weights in the within-group term add
up to one correspond to c = 1. However, the weights are given by the expression vm (Θ) for each m,
which depends on Θ. Therefore, in this case both the within-group and the between-group terms in
the decomposition depend on Θ.
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W k (Θ) = Σk pk I (zk (Θ)) (4)
is the within-group term, and
Bk (Θ) = I (µ1(Θ), ...,µK (Θ)) (5)
is the between-group term. Unfortunately, in this case both the within- and
between-group terms are “contaminated” by Θ. Therefore, one cannot disen-
tangle the impact of characteristic k on overall inequality independently of the
role played by the parameter Θ.
To overcome this shortcoming, we suggest applying the decomposability
property to the terms I (xm ) in expression (2), which are independent of Θ.
In other words, we propose considering the partition induced by characteristic
k into, say, the K geographical regions in a country within each homogeneous
subgroup consisting of households of equal size.
Let xmk be the unadjusted income vector of households of size m in region
k , let µmk be the mean of that distribution, and let rmk be the proportion of
households of type k among households of size m . For each m , I (xm ) is seen to
be equal to the sum of two terms:
I (xm ) = Σk rmk I (xmk ) + I (µm1 , ...,µmK ).
The first term is the weighted sum of the inequality within each subgroup of
the new partition, I (xmk ), with weights equal to the demographic shares, rmk ,
while the second one is the between-group inequality induced by characteristic
k among households of size m , I (µm1 , ...,µmK ), calculated as if each household
of size m receives the mean of the region where one lives in, µmk . If we now let
pmk be the proportion of households of size m in region k in the population as a
whole, then we have
U = Σmpm [Σk rmk I (xmk ) + I (µm1 (Θ), ...,µmK (Θ))]
= Σmk p
mk I (xmk ) + ΣmpmI (µm1 (Θ), ...,µmK (Θ)).
Thus, U = W k + Bk , where
W k = Σmk pmk I (xmk ), (6)
and
Bk = ΣmpmI (µm1 , ..., µmK ). (7)
Collecting terms, we have
I (z(Θ)) = U + C (Θ) = W k + Bk + C (Θ). (8)
Equation (6) is the within-group inequality in the partition by household size
and characteristic k . On the other hand, we have seen that I (µm1 , ...,µmK ) is the
between-group inequality induced by characteristic k among households of size
m. Thus, Eq. (7) is the between-group inequality attributable to characteristic
k . Of course, both Eqs.(6) and (7) capture the said effects after the effects of
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household size have been taken into account. In particular, Bk captures the extent
of between-group inequality that is orthogonal with household size. Inequality
arising from the interaction of the two variables is captured in the contaminated
term. Thus, the more variable k is correlated with household size, the lower is
the between-group inequality Bk , and the greater is the inequality arising from
the interaction of the two variables which is captured in the contaminated term
C (Θ). Therefore, the possibility that Bk reveals the explanatory power of overall
inequality attributed to a given characteristic k , once the effect of household size
has been taken into account – or in other words, the possibility of disentangling
what is going on in the term Bk (Θ) in Eq. (3) by using our decomposition proce-
dure – is inversely related to the degree of correlation between that characteristic
and household size.
To justify this procedure, we must confront the fact that, as pointed out
by Borooah and Collins (1995), if two characteristics k and j are related, the
inequality decomposition based upon the disaggregation of the population into
subgroups on the basis of a single characteristic, k or j , might be misleading. In
our lexicographic procedure, we feel we are justified in selecting first household
size on the grounds that it is the main variable responsible for economies of scale
within the household. Then, we believe that it is useful to classify all non-basic
variables according to that part of their explanatory power of overall inequality
which is orthogonal to household size, and hence independent of the way we
establish the interpersonal welfare comparisons which only enter through C (Θ).
Thus, if for two variables k and j similarly correlated with household size we
find that Bk/U is much greater than B j/U , then it is reasonable to say that
the population characteristic k is more important as a determinant of overall
inequality than is characteristic j .
2.4 The decomposition of the overall inequality trend
Let us denote by ∆I (Θ) the change in inequality between two situations, i.e.,
∆I (Θ) = I (z2(Θ))− I (z1(Θ)). This magnitude can be expressed as
∆I (Θ) = ∆U + ∆C (Θ), (9)
where:
∆U = U2 − U1 = ∆W + ∆D , (10)
∆W = Σmpm1 [I (xm2 )− I (xm1 )], (11)
∆D = Σm [pm2 − pm1 ]I (xm2 ), (12)
∆C (Θ) = I (µ12(Θ), ...,µM2 (Θ))− I (µ11(Θ), ...,µM1 (Θ)). (13)
Equation (10) is the change in uncontaminated inequality, which is seen to be
the sum of two terms: Eq. (11), which is the weighted sum of inequality changes
within each household size, and Eq. (12) which captures the impact of demo-
graphic changes across the partition by household size. Both are independent of
8
Θ, which only affects Eq. (13), namely, the change in between-group inequality
in the partition by household size.
The following decomposition of the overall inequality trend for any non-basic
partition k is useful:
∆I (Θ) = ∆U + ∆C (Θ) = ∆W k + ∆Bk + ∆Dk + ∆C (Θ), (14)
where:
∆W k = Σmk p
mk
1 [I (xmk2 )− I (xmk1 )], (15)
∆Bk = Σmpm1 [I (µm12 , ...,µmK2 )− I (µm11 , ...,µmK1 )], (16)
∆Dk = αk + βk , (17)
αk = Σm [pm2 − pm1 ]I (µm12 , ...,µmK2 ), (18)
and
βk = Σmk [pmk2 − pmk1 ]I (xmk2 ). (19)
Contrary to the approximation originally suggested by Mookherjee and Shorrocks
(1982) and used also by Jenkins (1995) and Ja¨ntti (1997), Eq. (14) provides an
exact decomposition of the overall inequality change9. Once the household size
effects depending on Θ have been taken into account, Eqs. (15), (16) and (17)
capture the contribution to the trend in uncontaminated inequality attributable to,
respectively:
– the change in inequality within the double partition by household size and
characteristic k ;
– the change in between-group inequality induced by characteristic k ;
– the demographic change across subgroups. This term reflects the impact of de-
mographic changes in two steps. On one hand, Eq. (18) captures the shifts in
population shares in the partition by household size weighted by the between-
group inequality induced by partition k among households of each size. On
the other hand, Eq. (19) reflects the impact of changes across the k -subgroups
within households of the same size, weighted by the inequality within each
subgroup k of size m .
Of course, for each partition k we have that ∆U = ∆W k + E k , where
E k = ∆Bk + ∆Dk (20)
is the total effect attributable to characteristic k . If for two partitions k and j we
find that E k/∆U is much greater than E j/∆U , then it is reasonable to say that
the characteristic k is more important as an explanatory factor of the change in
the uncontaminated term of overall inequality than is characteristic j .
Finally, looking at Eqs. (9) and (14), it should be emphasized that our de-
composition procedure will be more useful the smaller is the term ∆C (Θ). If
9 Of course, any linear combination of base and current inequality values (or demographic shares)
could be used to weight the terms in Eqs. (12), (18) and (19) (or Eqs. (11), (15) and (16), respectively).
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a large part of the change in overall inequality ∆I (Θ) is due to the change in
the contaminated term, ∆C (Θ), then our effort to analize in detail the change in
the uncotaminated term ∆U would be of a limited interest. Fortunately, as we
will see in the empirical Sect. 4.1, in the Spanish case during the 1980s the term
∆C (Θ) is very small indeed.
3 The data and the background for the 1980s
3.1 The data
We use data from the Spanish EPF for the periods April 1980 – March 1981 and
April 1990 – March 1991. These are large household budget surveys of 23,972
and 21,155 sample units, representing a population of approximately 10 or 11
million households and 37 or 38 million persons in 1980–1981 and 1990–1991,
respectively, occupying residential housing in all of Spain including the northern
African cities of Ceuta and Melilla.
Household welfare is approximated by a measure of current consumption,
namely, household total current expenditure on private goods and services, net
of expenditures on the acquisition of certain durables, but inclusive of imputa-
tions for home production, wages in kind, meals subsidized at work, and the
rental value for owner-occupied and other non rental housing10. Since we are
interested in personal rather than household welfare, we follow the usual prac-
tice of studying the personal distribution in which each person is assigned the
equivalised expenditures of the household to which she belongs – see Danziger
and Taussing (1979), Cowell (1984) and Shorrocks (1995).
We express household expenditures at constant prices of the Winter of 1991
by means of household-specific statistical price indices. These are estimated by
combining each household expenditure shares on a 57-dimensional commodity
space with the appropriate price relatives at the national level in that space
published by the INE – see Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999) for technical details.
All of our results in the sequel use the weighting factors provided by the INE
which make the sample representative of the entire population.
3.2 The background
From a macroeconomic point of view, the first fact that should be emphasized
is that the recession which started after the first oil crisis in 1973 did not end
in Spain until 1986. According to National Accounts figures, from 1980 until
1985 real GDP at 1986 prices grew only at an average annual rate of 1.4%,
while from that date until 1991 GDP grew at an average annual rate of 4.1%. It
is well known that Spain exhibits the highest official unemployment rate in the
EU. During the first half of the 1980s it rose to 21% of the labor force in 1986,
10 This is not the place to argue for or against expenditures versus income – on this issue see Del
Rı´o and Ruiz-Castillo (1996) and Ruiz-Castillo (1999).
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to be reduced later to 15.6% in 1991. Finally, during the 1980s, consumer price
inflation in Spain was 3 percentage points above the EU average.
The EPFs which provide the data source for this paper, provide information
about the rate of growth of private consumption in real terms between two points
in time during the decade. Let us denote by z1(Θ) and z2(Θ) the 1980–1981 and
1990–1991 distributions of adjusted household expenditures at Winter of 1991
prices. Mean equivalised household expenditures rose in real terms at an average
annual rate in the range of 2.3 to 3.3%, depending on the value we give to the
parameter Θ.
What do we know about overall income or expenditures inequality in Spain
during this period? As far as the structural aspects of inequality in a given year,
some patterns already found in other countries are essentially confirmed – see
Del Rı´o and Ruiz-Castillo (1997a): i) the explanatory power of the between-
group inequality attributable to household characteristics represents, at most, 20
to 28% of the uncontaminated term. ii) The importance of demographic variables,
like household type and the age of the household head, is negligible. iii) The
importance of inter-regional inequities -which explains less than 10% of uncon-
taminated inequality and about the same as the urban/rural variable- is smaller
than the attention they receive in current debates on inequality in many countries.
iv) The greatest explanatory power is provided by some socioeconomic variables,
notably, the educational level and the socioeconomic category of the household
head.
As far as the trend in household expenditures inequality, in Del Rı´o and Ruiz-
Castillo (1996) we found that z2(Θ) Lorenz dominates z1(Θ) for all Θ, so that
there is an unambiguous decrease in relative inequality in real terms11. Using
the Lorenz consistent mean logarithmic deviation, we find that real inequality
decreased from 8 to 10% depending on the value of Θ – see Table 2 below.
As we will see in the next section, decomposition analysis is a useful tool in
the search for an explanation of this trend. In the first place, both in Spain and in
other countries, shifts in subgroup population shares are often quoted as potential
determinants of inequality change. In the second place, relative variation in sub-
group means may give rise to important changes in between-group inequality. In
what follows, we first describe the potential explanatory factors. Then we use the
decomposition of the inequality trend to verify whether or not those factors are
important. In the third place, since the inequality trend unexplained through these
two avenues must be necessarily accounted for by changes in specific subgroup
inequality values, we check which subgroups have influenced the most (and the
least) the reduction in uncontaminated inequality.
11 This result is robust to different measures of a household standard of living, including total
household income.
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4 The inequality trend during the 1980s
4.1 The partition by household size
For the partition by household size, Table 1 presents the information on sam-
ple sizes, the change in mean household expenditures for an intermediate value
of the equivalence scale parameter, namely, Θ = 0.4, and the change in de-
mographic shares which, according to Eqs. (13) and (12), affect the change in
overall inequality through the terms ∆C (Θ) and ∆D , respectively. The evidence
of the trend in uncontaminated, contaminated and overall inequality is presented
in Table 2.
Table 1. Mean household expenditures when Θ = 0.4, percentage change in the number of persons
during the 1980s, and personal frequency distribution in 1990–1991 in the partition by household
size
Sample size Mean hous. exps. Personal distribution
in index form, Θ = 0.4
Percentage change in% Subgroup
relative to the Pop. Share
Hsize 1990–1991 1980–1981 1990–1991 1980–1981 distribution in 1990–1991
1 person 2,174 66.1 70.6 44.9 2.9
2 persons 4,735 84.0 82.6 19.0 13.1
3 persons 4,427 98.9 98.8 25.8 18.3
4 persons 5,052 104.5 108.2 19.3 29.3
5 persons 2,822 103.5 104.0 0.2 19.4
6 persons 1,206 101.9 102.8 −20.6 9.6
7 persons 471 105.8 97.5 −31.9 4.5
8 or + persons 268 103.3 100.8 −52.7 2.9
TOTAL 21,155 100.0 100.0 3.8 100.0
The first row in Table 2 indicates that there is a reduction in real inequality of
about 8/10%, which is rather robust to changes in the parameter Θ. How do we
account for this change in terms of changes inside the partition by household size?
To begin with, the comparison of columns 2 and 3 in Table 1 shows that relative
changes in mean household expenditures when Θ = 0.4 appear to be small. This
is also the case for other values of Θ (not shown here). Therefore, we do not
expect a large influence of ∆C (Θ) on ∆I (Θ) in Eq. (9). As we see in rows 2
and 4 of Table 2, when Θ grows from 0 to 1, there is first a gradual increase in
between-group inequality, which eventually becomes a decrease. In either case,
in absolute terms ∆C (Θ) accounts, at most, for only 10% of ∆I (Θ). Thus, as
expected, changes in between-group inequality in the partition by household size
are of moderate importance as an explanatory factor of overall inequality. On the
other hand, as indicated in row 6 of Table 2, uncontaminated inequality decreases
by approximately 10%. This means that most of the reduction in overall inequality
– from 90 to 110% – must be attributed to the change in the uncontaminated
term (see row 5 of Table 2).
The next question is to inquire as to how much of this change is due to shifts
in the population frequency distribution by household size, ∆D – see Eq. (12).
Taking 5 person households – whose numbers remain essentially constant – as
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Table 2. The trend in uncontaminated, contaminated and overall expenditures inequality during the
1980s
Equivalence scales parameter Θ:
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.0
Rate of change (in%) relative to overall inequality:
1. Overall inequality −8.1 −8.7 −9.3 −10.0 −10.2
= 100∆I (.)/I1(.)
2. Contaminated inequality 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.1 −1.0
= 100∆C (.)/I1(.)
3. Uncontaminated inequality −8.6 −9.5 −10.1 −10.1 −9.1
= 100∆U /I1(.)
Percentage of the change in overall inequality (in%) accounted for by:
4 . Contaminated inequality = −6.7 −9.7 −8.9 −1.5 10.0
Row 2 / Row 1 =100 ∆C (.)/∆I (.)
5. Uncontaminated inequality 106.7 109.7 108.9 101.5 90.0
= Row 3 / Row 1 = 100 ∆U /∆I (.)
Rate of change in uncontaminated inequality (in %):
6. 100 ∆U /U1 −10.3 −10.3 −10.3 −10.3 −10.3
Percentage of the change in overall inequality (in % ) accounted for by:
7. Demographic shifts −13.0 −13.0 −13.0 −13.0 −13.0
= 100 ∆D/∆U
8. Within group inequality 113.0 113.0 113.0 113.0 113.0
= 100 ∆W /∆U
reference in Table 1, the larger the household the larger the population decline,
and the smaller the household the larger the population increase. As a result,
average household size decreases from 3.70 to 3.41 members. Since these changes
are undoubtedly large, we expect a noticeable influence of ∆D on ∆U according
to Eq. (10). In row 7 of Table 2 we estimate that 100(∆D/∆U ) = −13. Therefore,
the switch towards smaller households during the 1980s, documented in Table
1, gives rise to a moderate increase in inequality which represents about 13% of
the overall change in the uncontaminated term. Taking into account that smaller
households are more unequal (although this fact is not shown here), this result
comes as no surprise.
The final question is to account for the trend in the within-group term ∆W
in terms of the inequality change within individual subgroups in the partition by
household size. We have seen that about 113% of the reduction in the uncontami-
nated term must be explained within this partition. To investigate the contribution
of each subgroup to the decrease in W, let us write Eq. (11) as ∆W = Σm∆I m ,
where ∆Im = pm1 [I (xm2 ) − I (xm1 )] and pm1 is the share of households of size m
in the 1980–1981 personal population. In Table 3 we look at the expression
(∆I m/∆W )100 for each m in relation to pm1 .
We observe that, relative to their demographic importance, the contribution to
the reduction in within-group inequality by both small and very large households
is very large. Households consisting of 3 members or less represent less than
30% of the population but account for more than 50% of the inequality change,
while 8 or more person households represent 6.5% of the population but account
for more than 20% of the inequality change. On the other hand, 4 to 6 person
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Table 3. Percentage contribution to within-group inequality in the partition by household size in
comparison with each subgroup’s demographic importance in 1980–1981
Household size
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 and + All
Contr. = (∆I m/∆W )100 6.8 20.9 23.9 2.2 17.3 0.02 8.2 12.0 8.7 100.0
Demogr. share = pM1 2.1 11.4 15.1 25.5 20.1 12.5 6.8 3.3 3.2 100.0
households, which contain almost 60% of the population, contribute only about
20% of the change.
4.2 The explanatory role of the remaining partitions
We have information on five household characteristics, classified into three
groups: Demographic characteristics: 1) Household type (HTYPE); Geographic
characteristics: 2) Size of the municipality (MUNS); 3) Autonomous Commu-
nity of residence (AUTON). Socioeconomic characteristics: 4) Educational level
attained by the household head (EDC); and 5) Socioeconomic status of the house-
hold head (SOCIO)12. For each of the five characteristics, Table 4 presents the
subgroup means of household expenditures when Θ = 0.4, the change in the
number of persons during the 1980s and, to save space, the personal frequency
distribution and the mean household size (denoted mhs) for 1990–1991 only13.
On the other hand, in relation to the decomposition in Eq. (14), the evidence on
(∆Bk/∆U )100, (αk/∆U )100, (βk/∆U )100, (∆Dk/∆U )100, and (E k/∆U )100
for each k is presented, respectively, in columns 1 to 5 of Table 5 – see the
definitions of these terms in Eqs. (16) to (19).
To begin with, as far as the mean household expenditures is concerned, the
only unambiguous pattern we observe in Table 4 is the decline in the range of
the index numbers when Θ = 0.4 for the two socioeconomic variables EDC and
SOCIO. Taking into account Eq. (16), this leads us to expect a positive contribu-
tion by these variables to the reduction in the uncontaminated inequality during
this period. Indeed, as we observe in column 1 of Table 5, the socioeconomic
variables EDC and SOCIO make a large positive contribution to the reduction
in uncontaminated inequality. On the other hand, the variables AUTON and
HTYPE have effects of some relevance in the opposite direction.
Our next question is the impact of demographic factors captured in the term
∆Dk . In Eq. (17) we have seen that ∆Dk = αk + βk . We shall start by the term
12 We have also examined two other possibilities: the age of the household head, and the number
of earners of labor and non-labor (mainly, public transfers) income. Since the results indicated that
these variables add very little to the analysis – see Del Rı´o and Ruiz-Castillo (1997a) – we have
omitted these variables in this paper.
13 We have tried to preserve the maximum heterogeneity in each partition. Therefore, some of the
subgroups might have a small sample size which will affect the reliability of individual results. The
minimum sample size in each partition are the following. HTYPE: 598 (households without a couple
and minors); AUTON: 221 (Ceuta y Melilla); TMUN: 1944 (above 500,000 inhabitants); SOCIO:
50 (living off property income); EDC: 914 (more than 3 years College degree); HSIZE: 268 (8 or
more persons).
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Table 4. Mean household expenditures when Θ = 0.4, percentage change in the number of per-
sons during the 1980s, and personal frequency distribution in 1990–1991 in the different non-basic
partitions
Personal distribution
Mean house. expends. Percentage change Frequency
in index form, Θ = 0.4 in% relative distribution mhs in
EDC 1980–1981 1990–1991 to the 1980–1981 in 1990–1991 1990–1991
distribution
Illiterate 61 62 −42.1 3.5 2.69
Without formal 76 76 −18.2 19.7 3.14
studies
Grade School 97 92 −15.8 39.4 3.50
Primary School 122 103 133.1 15.1 3.68
Secondary School 151 127 59.4 7.4 3.39
Vocational School 129 115 260.1 5.4 3.56
3 years College 161 143 41.3 4.7 3.47
degree
> 3 ys. College 197 188 38.8 4.8 3.52
degree
ALL 100.0 100.0 3.8 100.0 3.41
SOCIO
Agricultural 70 75 −35.3 3.3 4.03
workers
Agricultural 75 81 −47.6 3.1 3.89
self-employed
Non-agricultural 107 101 −10.5 38.5 3.91
workers
Non-agricultural 104 110 13.2 8.4 3.95
self-employed
Supervisors and 121 131 44.6 3.5 3.99
Armed Forces
Upper classes* 175 155 33.7 9.1 3.79
Unclassified 106 108 −5.0 0.4 3.95
active persons
Part time (less 82 101 −38.1 1.2 3.55
than 1/3
working day)
Unemployed 73 78 1.7 5.5 3.73
Early retired 80 90 61.0 9.6 3.26
(before 65
years of age)
Retired, male 73 81 51.5 12.1 2.55
Retired, female 62 67 65.9 3.4 1.55
Living off 98 128 −28.0 0.2 2.31
property income
Other people 93 77 10.6 1.7 2.69
outside of the
labor force
ALL 100.0 100.0 3.8 100.0 3.41
∗ Entrepeneurs with salaried workers, professionals, agricultural and non-agricultural firm executives,
public Administration high officials
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Table 4. (continued)
HTYPE
Single person 66 71 44.7 2.9 1.00
Couples 84 83 19.1 10.0 2.00
Three or 92 92 −5.1 3.9 2.60
more adults
Couples with 111 115 75.4 17.4 3.66
young (18–30 years
old) descendants
Couples with 101 98 −15.9 28.5 3.93
minors (less than
18 years old)
Couples with 108 107 −1.3 16.0 5.16
minors and young
descendants
Couples with 101 103 −15.6 11.3 5.34
minors and/or young
descendants as well
as older people
Single parent 94 94 27.7 5.9 3.07
households
Households without 93 94 9.1 4.1 5.19
a couple and minors
All 100.0 100.0 3.8 100.0 3.41
Descendants = children and/or grandchildren
TMUN
Under 2,000 80 77 −34.0 6.5 3.05
2,000–10,000 80 84 5.0 19.4 3.41
10,000–50,000 92 92 6.9 22.8 3.53
50,000–500,000 110 104 14.5 32.7 3.50
Above 500,000 126 127 2.9 18.6 3.25
All 100.0 100.0 3.8 100.0 3.41
αk . By comparing Eqs. (18) and (12), we see that the difference between αk
and ∆D is that changes in population shares are now weighted by the between-
group inequality induced by each k in the partition by household size. We have
already seen that the shift towards smaller households reflected in ∆D amounts
to an inequality increase which is equal to 13% of the change in uncontaminated
inequality. On the other hand, it turns out that for the variables AUTON, HTYPE
and SOCIO, the between-group inequality term I (µm1 , ...,µmK ) for low values
of m , say m ≤ 4, is relatively small. The opposite is the case for the partitions
MUNS and EDC (these results are available on request). This explains that, as
we see in column 2 of Table 5, αk/∆U has a negative sign only for MUNS and
EDC.
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Table 4. (continued)
AUTON
Andalucı´a 85 86 8.1 7.8 3.65
Arago´n 100 90 2.1 3.1 3.10
Asturias 96 102 −0.3 2.9 3.26
Baleares 104 107 3.6 1.7 3.15
Canarias 91 94 8.4 3.8 3.72
Cantabria 112 94 3.9 1.4 3.46
Castilla-Leo´n 91 90 1.8 6.7 3.21
Castilla-La Mancha 75 83 4.1 4.4 3.30
Catalun˜a 110 119 0.6 15.3 3.27
C. Valenciana 97 89 4.2 9.8 3.29
Extremadura 69 72 6.4 2.9 3.39
Galicia 96 91 0.4 7.2 3.57
Madrid 125 128 5.4 12.6 3.41
Reino de Murcia 93 87 9.0 2.6 3.61
Navarra 122 120 2.7 1.3 3.50
Paı´s Vasco 121 113 −0.1 5.5 3.45
La Rioja 96 95 1.3 0.7 3.37
Ceuta y Melilla 94 76 8.3 0.3 3.55
All 100.0 100.0 3.8 100.0 3.41
The term βk depends in a direct fashion on the shifts in population shares
across the subgroups of each partition k . What we observe in this respect in
column 3 of Table 4, can be summarized as follows:
1. Fertility rates are declining, so that households with minors (HTYPE equal
to 5, 6 or 7) are losing importance. Young persons (between 18 and 30 years
old), heavily hit by unemployment, remain in their parents’ homes rather than
forming independent households of their own (HTYPE = 4). Single person
households and couples without children, as well as single parent households
(HTYPE = 1, 2, and 8, respectively), are increasing more rapidly than the
population as a whole.
2. Households headed by persons with a primary school degree and beyond, are
increasing, while the opposite is the case for illiterates, people without formal
studies or with only grade school.
3. Households headed by someone in the agricultural sector, part-time employ-
ment, and the small subgroup living off property income are losing demo-
graphic importance. The mixed subgroup headed by supervisors or Armed
Forces personnel, the upper socioeconomic category and, above all, retired
people of all kinds, are increasing above the average rate.
4. Relatively large sized households are leaving small municipalities, while more
people are moving into medium sized cities and provincial capitals between
50,000 and 500,000 inhabitants.
5. Only Madrid and five less developed Autonomous Communities (the Canary
Islands, Andalucı´a, Extremadura, Murcia and Ceuta y Melilla) are growing
above the national rate. Baleares Islands, Comunidad Valenciana, Castilla-La
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Table 5. The impact on the reduction in uncontaminated inequality (in percentage terms) of: (i) the
change in between-group inequality induced by each partition, and (ii) demographic changes across
partition subgroups
Between-group Demographic changes Total
Inequality effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AUTON = Autonomous Community −12.2 4.6 −27.5 −22.9 −35.1
HTYPE = household type −19.2 7.1 −23.0 −15.9 −35.1
MUNS = municipality size 22.8 −2.2 −12.7 −14.9 7.9
SOCIO = h. head’s socioeconomic class 64.0 4.3 −39.3 −35.0 29.0
EDC = h. head’s educatioonal level 54.9 −2.5 −0.4 −2.9 52.0
(1) = 100∆Bk/∆U = percentage change in the uncontaminated term due to the change in between-
group inequality induced by characteristic k ; (2) = 100αk/∆U , equation (18); (3) = 100βk/∆U ,
equation (19); (4) = (2) + (3) = 100∆Dk/∆U = percentage change in the uncontaminated term due to
shifts in population shares; (5) = (1) + (4) = 100E k/∆U = total effect attributable to characteristic k
Mancha and Cantabria grow close to the average rate, while the rest of the
North (Paı´s Vasco, Asturias, Galicia, La Rioja) Castilla-Leo´n and Catalun˜a
grow at a smaller rate or even lose some population.
At first, the shifts just summarized for the demographic and the socioeco-
nomic variables – but not for the geographical ones – appear to be rather im-
portant. However, for our purpose the pertinent question is how much of the
reduction in uncontaminated inequality is accounted for by these demographic
changes. The evidence, reflected in the term βk , appears in column 3 of Table 5.
We observe that shifts in population shares within the double partition by house-
hold size and the remaining characteristics have a negative contribution to the
reduction in uncontaminated inequality. Moreover, except for EDC, the term βk
is large and offsets the effect captured in αk . Therefore, as shown in column 4 of
Table 5, the net demographic effect on ∆U attributable to ∆Dk = αk + βk is an
increase in inequality in all cases. As far as the order of magnitude is concerned,
it is of some importance for SOCIO (35%), negligible for EDC, and between
15 and 23% of ∆U for the remaining variables.
The consequences of all of the above is reflected in column 5 of Table 5
which presents the total effect attributable to each k . There are two types of
variables from this point of view. Those for which the increase in between-group
inequality leads to an increase in uncontaminated inequality (or to a negative
total effect) – AUTON, and HTYPE – and those for which the opposite is the
case – SOCIO and EDC. For the first type, we must go to the contributions
by individual subgroups to understand the inequality change. On the contrary,
the second group of variables provides a partial but important explanation of the
overall trend which amounts to one third or one half, respectively, of the reduction
in uncontaminated inequality. Thus, the fact that most variables account for a
small percentage of overall inequality at a given point of time does not preclude
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that some of them have a considerable effect in accounting for the trend in overall
inequality14.
As we said before, Borooah and Collins (1995) point out that if two charac-
teristics k and j are related, the inequality decomposition based upon the disag-
gregation of the population into subgroups on the basis of a single characteristic,
k or j , might be misleading. Therefore, we have created some new ones: i) the
combination of the demographic variables HTYPE with the age of the household
head into 16 subgroups; ii) a variable which distinguishes urban from rural mu-
nicipalities in each Autonomous Community, giving rise to 36 subgroups; iii) the
combination of two human capital variables, the age and the educational level of
the household head, giving rise to 14 subgroups; iv) the combination of the two
socioeconomic characteristics SOCIO and EDC into 16 subgroups; and v) the
combination of EDC and the number of earners of labor and non-labor income
into 17 categories. However, as discussed in Del Rı´o and Ruiz-Castillo (1997a),
these five characteristics do not add anything new to the analysis.
Finally, we should point out that under the usual procedure based on Eqs. (3)
to (5), the impact of each non-basic partition appears mixed up with the household
size effects. Therefore, the contribution of demographic shifts or changes in
subgroup means would vary as a function of Θ. Due to lack of space, to compare
our results with those obtained with the usual procedure see Del Rı´o and Ruiz-
Castillo (1997a).
4.3 The explanatory role of individual subgroups
The final question is to account for the reduction in the within-group term ∆W k
in terms of the change within each individual subgroup in each partition k . We
can rewrite Eq. (15) as ∆W k = Σk∆I k , where ∆I k = Σmpmk1 [I (xmk2 ) − I (xmk1 )].
The information about the expressions (∆I k/∆W k )100 and pmk1 for the more
important partitions – SOCIO and EDC – is in Table 6 (for the remaining
partitions the information is available upon request).
For the socioeconomic category, the following subgroups account for 65% of
the reduction in within-group inequality: households headed by someone in the
agricultural categories or part-time employment (SOCIO = 1, 2, 8), as well as
persons outside the labor force (SOCIO = 10–14). This is a large contribution by
a subgroup set whose demographic importance is only one third of the population.
Which subgroups contribute in the opposite direction is equally revealing. These
are households headed by the unemployed and the self employed (SOCIO = 9,
4), which have a combined contribution of 18% to the increase in within-group
inequality and represent approximately that same percentage of the population.
14 In spite of what he afirms in the text, Ja¨ntti (1997) also finds effects of similar importance. For
the equivalence scales implicit in the U.S. official poverty line, he reports that age of the household
head accounts for 50, 36 and 20% of the change in overall inequality in Sweden, Canada and the
U.S., respectively; household type accounts for 38% in Sweden, and the numeber of earners accounts
for 48% in the U.K.
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Table 6. Individual contributions to the change in within-group inequality in selected partitions
SOCIO Contribution to the Personal
reduction in frequency
within-group ineq. Distribution
in 1980–81
Workers, agricultural 12.1 5.4
Self-employed, agricultural 9.8 6 2
Non-agricultural workers 52.1 44.6
Non-agricult. self-employed −10.6 7.7
Supervisors and Armed Forces 0 5 2 5
Upper classes 0 2 7 1
Unclassified active persons −0 1 0.4
Part time (less than 1/3 working day) 7 5 2.0
Unemployed −7.7 5.6
Early retired (before 65 years of age) 7 5 6.2
Retired, male 17.2 8.3
Retired, female 5.2 2.1
Living off property income 1.9 0.2
Other people outside of the labor force 4.4 1.6
ALL 100.0 100.0
EDC
Illiterate 11.7 6.3
Without formal studies 45.9 25.0
Grade School 51.9 48.6
Primary School 2 5 6.7
Secondary School −5.7 4.8
Vocational School 1.8 1.6
3 years College degree 5 2 3.5
> 3 ys. College degree −13 3 3.6
ALL 100.0 100.0
For the educational level, households headed by an illiterate or a person
without formal studies (EDC = 1, 2) contribute more than half of the reduction
in within-group inequality but represent less than one third of the population. At
the opposite extreme, we have households headed by a person who has attained
a secondary school or a College degree (EDC = 5, 8) which represent 8% of the
population and are only responsible for a 20% increase in inequality.
5 Conclusions
Inequality decomposition methods provide a useful approach to the investigation
of the structure of inequality in a given year, the explanation of the inequality
trend over time, and the connection between the inequality of the population
as a whole and the inequality within specific subgroups. Unfortunately, in a
heterogeneous world of households with different needs, we must allow for a
variety of equivalence scales which may dramatically affect the results of the
decomposition analysis.
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In this paper we have adopted a simple model in which equivalence scales
depend only on household size through a parameter Θ which captures the im-
portance we give to economies of scale in consumption within the household.
In this context, we have proposed a decomposition method which uses the mean
logarithmic deviation and minimizes equivalence scales potential contamination
problems. The alternative is what we call the usual procedure in which the role
of all variables is affected by the choice of equivalence scales.
The claim is that the method we propose structures and simplifies the analysis
in a convenient way. Firstly, we address the partition by household size, where the
complications introduced by the use of a variety of equivalence scales is isolated
in the between-group inequality term. In this way, we can then concentrate on
the role of the remaining variables through its effects, orthogonal to household
size, which are independent of the equivalence scales.
In the empirical part of the paper we apply this method to account for the
inequality trend of household expenditures in Spain between 1980–1981 and
1990–1991 at Winter 1991 prices. During this period, overall inequality decreases
in the 8 to 10% range, depending on the value of the equivalence scales parameter
Θ. Our main findings can be organized in two groups. In the first place, the
following three forces can be discarded as factors accounting for this trend:
1. The (non linear) changes in the contaminated term, caused by changes in the
mean expenditures of households of different sizes, have a low explanatory
power: from 90 to 109% of the change in overall inequality as a function of
Θ is accounted for a reduction of 10.3% in the uncontaminated term (rows 5
and 6 in Table 2).
2. Subgroup demographic shifts in the partition by household size have a rela-
tively small but negative effect on uncontaminated inequality: the shift towards
smaller households (column 4 in Table 1), also found in other Western coun-
tries, is responsible for a 13% increase in the uncontaminated term (row 7 in
Table 2).
3. Once we apply the decomposition property of our inequality measure to each
household size separately, in general the demographic factor associated to
non-basic partitions also causes an increase in uncontaminated inequality.
Sometimes the role of a variable reinforces the demographic effect due to
shifts in household sizes – as in the case of SOCIO – while in other cases
the demographic effect turns out to be negligible – as in the case of EDC
(columns 2 to 4 in Table 5).
In the second place, it is clear that the two key variables accounting for the
reduction in uncontaminated inequality are the following:
4. As far as the variable SOCIO is concerned, households headed by a retired
person have mean expenditures below the population as a whole but have im-
proved their relative positions regardless of their age and sex. Since they have
also increased their numbers, this must be the consequence of two features of
the public and universal Social Security retirement system during this period:
the increased scope via non-contributive pensions, and the increase in the pen-
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sions themselves, especially the minimum ones – see Boldrin et al. (1998).
On the other hand, both agricultural categories, also below the average, have
improved their lot as well. In this case, this is partly the consequence of their
diminished population share: the decline of agricultural jobs continued unde-
terred during the 1980s. The other factor which should be emphasized is the
entrance of Spain into the European Union. On one hand, agricultural sectors
able to export (the East coast and the river valleys), have done well from
1986 onwards. On the other hand, less competitive areas (the two Castilles,
Andalucı´a and Extremadura) have benefited from high European protection to
grains, olive and wine. In the North of the country and Galicia, the livestock
and milk protection system have led to anticipated retirement under acceptable
economic conditions – see San Juan (1995a, 1995b).
These factors, together with the drastic relative decline in size of the upper
classes, explain why SOCIO’s total effect accounts for one third of the change
in uncontaminated inequality. This happens through the reduction of between-
group inequality which more than offsets the inequality increase due to the
demographic factor (columns 1 and 4 in Table 5). The remaining two thirds
of the reduction of uncontaminated inequality take place within the partition
subgroups. In so far as households headed by a retired person or in the agri-
cultural labor force contribute very heavily to this reduction of within-group
inequality, we may conclude that the forces which lead to an increase of their
mean household expenditures also cause a reduction of their inequality (Table
6).
5. As far as the variable EDC is concerned, only the households headed by an
illiterate or a person without formal studies maintain their relative positions in
mean household expenditures. All remaining subgroups lose relative ground.
A fact for which, at present, we do not have a convincing explanation. Since
the demographic effect does not subtract much from the total effect (colunm
4 in Table 5), the reduction in the between-group inequality is the factor
responsible for fifty per cent of the reduction in uncontaminated inequality
(columns 1 and 5 in Table 5). As we saw before for the SOCIO partition, the
lowest educational categories are the subgroups which contribute more than
proportionally to the reduction in within-group inequality (Table 6).
One useful way of summarizing the essential aspects of our analysis is to
focus on what happens at both ends of the distribution. At the lower tail of the
distribution (the retired and the agricultural categories, the aged, the illiterate and
those without formal studies – all of which are well represented among one and
two person households), there has been an increase in the mean household expen-
ditures and an important decrease in inequality. The first fact causes a reduction
in uncontaminated inequality through between-group effects; the second causes
the same impact, but directly through the within-group term. In some segments
of the upper tail of the distribution there has been a loss in relative positions
– contributing to the between-effects already mentioned – and an increase in
inequality. As a consequence, for all values of Θ the reduction in household
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expenditures inequality should be smaller for members of the GE family more
sensitive to what happens at the upper tail of the distribution. This is indeed what
we observe: when Θ = 0.5, for example, the reduction in inequality at Winter
1981 prices is equal to – 12.9,−9.6,−7.0, and −1.8% when c = −1, 0, 1, 2,
respectively – see Del Rı´o et al. (1999).
It is worth pointing out that this is a very different pattern from the one
found for the period 1973–1974 to 1980–1981, during which the decrease of
household expenditures inequality is more important than during the 1980s – see
Ruiz-Castillo (1995b, 1998b). In particular, when Θ = 0.5 the reduction in in-
equality at Winter of 1981 prices is equal to −20.5,−19.0,−21.1, and −28.5%
when c = −1, 0, 1, 2, respectively. This indicates that in the former period the
more important changes are the ones which take place in the upper tail of the
distribution. A second difference is that the geographic variables AUTON and
MUNS are the ones contributing the most (30%) to the reduction in uncontam-
inated inequality. The variables EDC and SOCIO account for 25 and 15% of
the trend, respectively. Finally, when we look into this last partition we find that,
together with the middle and the upper classes, the reduction in inequality within
retired households again plays a significant part in accounting for the trend in
uncontaminated inequality.
Before we finish, one may ask how we can explain the reduction of household
expenditures inequality in spite of the rise in unemployment rates. In this paper
we have seen that the number of persons living in households headed by an
unemployed person has remained practically constant, representing 5.5% of the
population in 1990–1991. But we know that unemployment is particularly large
among the young, and we have seen that households with young dependents
between 17 and 30 years old have experienced a considerable increase. As a
matter of fact, Del Rı´o and Ruiz-Castillo (1997b) find that, in spite of the fact
that those looking for a first job have lost relative positions during the 1980s,
the young unemployed who live as dependants in the parental home are not far
from the national mean in the distribution of equivalised household expenditures,
and better off than any other unemployed subgroup. This is in line with Revenga
(1991)’s suggestion that these living arrangements might have helped offset the
negative effects that, otherwise, increasing unemployment rates among the young
could have caused in overall inequality15. In any case, as we have seen, the
subgroup mean expenditures index for households headed by an unemployed has
increased slightly from 72 to 78 during the 1980s, contributing to a decrease in
between-group inequality. Moreover, it should be noted that this is one of the
few subgroups for which inequality has increased.
However, we must take into account that many of the young persons re-
maining in the parental home are employed and their earnings are part of total
household income. Total household income is also affected by the increase in
labor participation of married women and the fact that many beneficiaries of old
15 One of the conclusions in Martı´nez and Ruiz-Castillo (2001), where the decisions to work, to
study and to remain or not in the parental house are jointly modelled, is that parents help their young
offspring through corresidence when the later do not have a job or are studying.
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age and disability pensions live as dependents in their children’s homes. More re-
search on the income side is needed to determine whether the final picture is one
of an increase in labor and/or market personal earnings inequality, compensated
by changes in female labor participation, living arrangements and an increas-
ingly generous system of public transfers which lead to the present reduction in
household expenditures inequality.
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